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This paper deals with the fallacy of ambiguity. One of the requirements van
Eemeren and Grootendorst mention for an adequate theory of fallacies is that "it
should provide criteria for deciding when such a norm [for distinguishing between
reasonable and unreasonable moves in argumentative discourse] is violated" (van
Eemeren and Grootendorst 1992, 104). Recently, van Eemeren and Houtlosser
proposed a research program for the development of such criteria (van Eemeren and
Houtlosser 2003). In this paper, however, the issue of a proper criterion for the fallacy
of ambiguity is approached from a slightly different perspective: the immanent
dialectical one (Krabbe 1999).
Starting from a pragma-dialectical perspective on fallacy, the question to be
addressed is: how can we identify a fallacy of ambiguity committed by a participant
of an argumentative discussion? First, an outline of some basic dialectical principles
will be given. Second, an explication will be given of the kind of ambiguity that can
be characterised as fallacious. Third, the dialectical principles will be applied in order
to develop a criterion for the fallacy of ambiguity. Fourth, the applied method will be
compared with the research program by van Eemeren and Houtlosser. Fifth, it will be
shown that the resulting criterion will not always lead to clear results.

Dialectic
Dialectic constitutes a method that helps discussants who disagree about the
acceptability of a proposition to resolve their dispute. In this paper, attention will be
restricted to a simple kind of dispute: the proponent holds a statement to be
acceptable, while the opponent doubts whether it is correct. The dispute has been
resolved if the parties have reached an agreement in favour of either the opponent's or
the proponent's original position, provided that the agreement is the result of a
systematic attempt to reflect on the merits of the case, as the parties perceive these
merits. How does the method work? How can dialectic claim to help the parties to
decide the issue on the (perceived) merits of the case? The method involves a critical
discussion between the proponent of the main standpoint, referred to as White, and its
opponent, Black. A critical discussion can provide some guarantee for the
acceptability or unacceptability of a standpoint (and not for mere acceptance or lack
thereof) due to a certain division of tasks, combined with certain restrictions on the
ways these tasks may be performed (cf. Krabbe 2003b).
White commits herself to persuade Black of the acceptability of the main
standpoint by defending the standpoint against all criticisms that Black puts forward.
To fulfil this task successfully is the persuasive (van Eemeren and Houtlosser 2003)
or participant's aim (Walton and Krabbe 1995, 68) of White.1 White's task has been
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accomplished when Black makes it clear that he has been persuaded of the
acceptability of White's standpoint.
Black commits himself to cast doubt on the main standpoint and on the
reasons offered in favour of it, in order to show White that she lacks the means to
persuade him of the acceptability of the main standpoint. To fulfil this task
successfully is the persuasive or participant's aim of Black. This aim has been
achieved if White acknowledges the correctness of Black's stance and retracts her
main standpoint.
The commitments to the participants' aims are instrumental to the shared
commitment to resolve the dispute. The commitment to this main goal of the dialogue
(Walton and Krabbe 1995, 68) also implies the obligation to abstain from hindering or
obstructing one's interlocutor to achieve his or her participant's aim, except if one
'hinders' or 'obstructs' by offering genuine arguments or genuine argument criticisms.
This shared commitment provides restrictions on the devices the parties are allowed to
make use of in order to achieve their participant's aims. By specifying dialectical
models we can study where the boundaries might be found between genuine argument
and argument criticism on the one hand and undue hindering and obstruction on the
other.
Van Eemeren and Houtlosser introduce the concept of strategic manoeuvring
in order to study rhetorical considerations from a dialectical perspective, and to
explicate fallacies as derailed strategic manoeuvres (van Eemeren and Houtlosser
2003). A strategic manoeuvre is an attempt by a discussant to reconcile his persuasive
aims with his critical commitment to resolve the dispute.
If we apply this idea to the framework introduced above, we could say that
Black should manoeuvre strategically in order to reconcile his attempts to get White
to give up her standpoint, with his commitment not to hinder White by anything else
than by genuine criticism. White should manoeuvre strategically in order to persuade
Black of the acceptability of the standpoint, without using means that might distort
Black's reflections on the case at issue. The rules for critical discussion should make
the means available by which the discussants may try to achieve their participant's
aims, and they should provide the restrictions generated by the commitment to resolve
the dispute. Thus, if a strategic manoeuvre violates such a restriction for critical
discussion the strategic manoeuvre is derailed.
The commitment to achieve one's participant’s aim encourages the parties to
put forward all considerations that might be effective to win over the other party. The
commitment to the main goal encourages the parties to abstain from breaking down
the process of conflict resolution. This arrangement provides some guarantee that
good arguments and good criticisms will be put forward and stand firm, while bad
arguments and bad criticisms will be retracted, if they are put forward at all. If Black
and White live up to their commitments and if Black accepts White's standpoint, we
have some guarantee that the standpoint really is worthy of acceptance (given Black’s
position). And if, conversely, White retracts her standpoint after considering Black's
criticisms, we have some guarantee that the standpoint really is unacceptable (given
Black’s position). Dialectic helps the good and the effective to merge (cf. Johnson
2000, 193).
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Active ambiguity
As Walton observes: the expression ambiguity itself is (in a sense) ambiguous
(1996, 22). One way of showing its ambiguity is to present a fallacy of equivocation
that might arise from its use (van Laar 2003).
Almost all English expressions are ambiguous.
If a discussant uses an expression that is ambiguous, we may object to the use
of the expression.
Therefore, we may object to the use of almost all English expressions by a
discussant.
There is a sense of ambiguity that makes the second reason acceptable. This is the
sense, called active ambiguity, that will be examined in this paper. In this reading the
first reason is unacceptable. There is also a sense of the term that makes the first
reason acceptable. However, this sense, called semantic ambiguity, is a much wider
sense, as is shown in figure 1 below. In this reading the second reason is
unacceptable. Moreover, the set of reasons only provides sufficient ground to concede
the standpoint if both occurrences of ambiguous are disambiguated in the same way.2
The figure must be read in such a way that if an expression is contextually
ambiguous, it is semantically ambiguous, etc.

semantic ambiguity contextual ambiguity

covert contextual
ambiguity
active ambiguity

Figure 1.
An expression is semantically ambiguous when it may express different
meanings in different contexts of utterance (bank, for instance). An expression is
contextually ambiguous within a context of utterance when it expresses several
possible meanings within that context (bank, in a conversation where it might equally
refer to a river edge or to a financial institution). It is covertly contextually ambiguous
when the contextually ambiguous expression is not presented in a way that makes it
clear (directly or indirectly) to the intended audience that the ambiguity is intentional
(so, the kind of ambiguity that is characteristic for either jokes or poems is not
ambiguity in this particular sense).
In order for a contextually and covertly ambiguous expression to be
objectionable from the perspective of dispute resolution, another requirement must be
fulfilled: the distinctions between the contextually admissible meanings of the
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expression must, in some way or other, be relevant for the discussion at hand. If this
requirement has also been met the expression is actively ambiguous (a term adopted
from Naess, 1953, 75-6).
There are at least two ways in which a contextually and covertly ambiguous
expression can be relevant for the course of the discussion. First, the expression can
be the source of a fallacy of equivocation, such as the argument discussed above. In
such a case the actively ambiguous expression covers up a dialectical weakness or
flaw: every disambiguation of the argument either contains unacceptable basic
reasons, or it contains an (implicit) inference license that is unacceptable. Second, the
expression may be a likely source of a misunderstanding, that is, of a pseudoagreement or of a pseudodisagreement (Naess 1953, 122-141).
A discussant may come to use actively ambiguous expressions, without having
any intention to do so. However, there are strategic incentives to use actively
ambiguous statements. A discussant who has the role of proponent may profit from
covered up flaws, in the sense that the interlocutor may fail to notice the flaws, and
fail to criticise questionable elements in the argument. A pseudo-agreement that
remains undetected is also prima facie profitable for the proponent, because it implies
a situation where the opponent concedes a statement that, as read by the proponent,
expresses something that the opponent really disagrees with: a pseudo-agreement
provides the proponent with a possibly useful, but not really deserved, concession to
base her argument on. However, a pseudodisagreement that goes unnoticed helps the
opponent to win over the proponent, because it implies a situation where the opponent
challenges a statement that, as read by the proponent, expresses something that the
opponent really agrees with: the opponent, whether or not intentionally, withholds a
concession from the proponent that could be used to support her standpoint.
Therefore, although the use of actively ambiguous expressions may serve the
individual aim of a party, it hinders the other party from offering effective arguments
or from criticising arguments in an effective manner. Moreover, the interlocutor's
position is not weakened due to the force of argument or criticism, but due to the
circumstance that relevant information remains hidden. Consequently, the use of
active ambiguity is detrimental to the main goal of critical discussion.
As said before, in this paper the pragma-dialectical definition of fallacy will be
adopted. Given that using an active ambiguity harms the prospects of dispute
resolution, using active ambiguities is fallacious, and should be ruled out by a
restrictive rule for critical discussion, such as 'do not use actively ambiguous
expressions.' This rule, that I shall call the rule for univocal language use, resembles
the part of the tenth pragma-dialectical rule (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1992,
196) that prohibits the use of confusingly ambiguous expressions. The fallacy of
ambiguity will thus be defined as a violation of the rule for the univocal use of
language. Equivocation is considered as a subtype of the fallacy of ambiguity.
However, there are good reasons to consider the rule for the univocal use of
language as a regulative rule only, expressing a regulative ideal. The rule is not part
of the set of rules that defines and constitutes critical discussion. One reason is that
there are situations where discussants cannot in fairness demand of each other to
avoid active ambiguities: whether or not an expression is actively ambiguous can
often not be determined before the discussion starts (van Laar 2001). Even though the
rules for critical discussion should encourage the discussants to use formulations that
are univocal within the context of utterance, the constitutive rules do not need to ban
active ambiguities completely. The use of active ambiguities must, however, be seen
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as violations of the regulative rule for the univocal use of language, and as fallacious
in that particular sense.3

Towards a criterion for the fallacy of ambiguity
We are after a criterion that enables a discussant or an analyst to decide that
someone has committed a fallacy of ambiguity. According to the immanent dialectical
point of view "ultimately, the status of an argument must be decided in discussion, by
the participants themselves. Dependent on that outcome the argument is reconstructed
as valid, as doubtful, as erroneous, as a blunder, or even as a fallacy" (Krabbe 1999,
467). In this paper, attention will be restricted to situations where there is an issue of
whether White, the proponent of the main thesis, has committed the fallacy of
ambiguity.4
Whether an argument, or another kind of argumentative move, is fallacious
due to a violation of the rule for the univocal use of language should be decided in a
metadiscussion about the admissibility of a formulation in the ground level discussion
(see Krabbe 2003a for a discussion about metadialogue and ground level dialogue).
This metadiscussion should itself be a critical discussion about the acceptability of the
standpoint that a particular expression is actively ambiguous. An immanent dialectical
criterion for the fallacy of ambiguity, committed by White, can now be formulated in
a skeletal form: White has committed the fallacy of ambiguity against Black if and
only if Black wins a critical metadiscussion in which he defends the standpoint that
White has used an expression that is actively ambiguous. (A similar criterion can be
set up for a fallacy of ambiguity committed by Black.)
In order to elaborate this criterion, we can state the rules that are appropriate
for such a metadiscussion. Because the kind of standpoint at issue in the
metadiscussion is known, we can specify the rules for this kind of critical
metadiscussion in further detail. Thus, we can apply the basic principles of dialectic to
a metadiscussion about the issue whether or not White has committed a fallacy of
ambiguity. In addition, we are in need of rules for shifting from the original ground
level discussion to the metadiscussion and for shifting to the ground level discussion
again.
A proper division of tasks is determined by the participants' aims. A fallacy by
White is detrimental to Black's position, so Black should see to it that White does not
get away with a fallacy. Therefore, Black will be the proponent of the charge of active
ambiguity, while White will oppose it. In order to enable White to correct possible
faults in Black's charge, she must dispose over devices to criticise Black's charge. In
order to enable Black to sustain his charge, there must be means available to sustain
the criticism.
Some appropriate rules will be illustrated with the following example (the
dialectical model that contains these rules can be found in Van Laar 2003).
1. White: The Dutch bill Termination of life on request should be passed.
2. Black: Why?
3. White: Euthanasia, as a rule, is morally acceptable.
4. Black: The expression euthanasia is actively ambiguous!
5. White: Between what readings?
6. Black: The expression euthanasia is actively ambiguous between a broad reading
'termination of life on request' and a narrow reading 'termination, by a doctor, of the
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life of a patient who is suffering unbearably, who has no prospects, and who has
expressly and earnestly requested for this termination'.
At stage 4 Black raises a fallacy criticism. At stage 5 White requests Black to
specify the charge in more detail. Stage 6 contains a complete fallacy criticism, that
will be called ambiguity criticism. From stage 4 onwards the parties are engaged in a
metadiscussion about the admissibility of White's use of the term euthanasia in the
ground level discussion.
White must be able to criticise two components of the ambiguity criticism (in
addition to acknowledging the ambiguity criticism by disambiguating her arguments).
First she may challenge the linguistic admissibility of Black's charge: is the term
euthanasia, as used in the current context, contextually ambiguous? If there is
linguistic evidence that one of the readings of euthanasia, indicated by Black, is
linguistically inadmissible in the current context of utterance, Black loses the
metadiscussion and should retract his ambiguity criticism. If there is no such evidence
available, Black's criticism must be regarded as sustained, White loses the
metadiscussion, and White must disambiguate her arguments.
A second component of the ambiguity criticism that White may challenge is
the relevance of the ambiguity. She should have a right to request Black to show in
what way the distinction between the readings of euthanasia could be important for
the continuation of their discussion. Black should then either point out that conceding
the reason containing euthanasia would lead to a pseudo-agreement, or that this
reason is part of a fallacy of equivocation. Note that pointing out
pseudodisagreements helps White to achieve her participant's aim: consequently, the
task of pointing out pseudodisagreements should not be assigned to Black.
Black may point out a pseudo-agreement by conceding White's reason in one
disambiguation of euthanasia, while challenging it in the other sense: 'I concede that
termination, by a doctor, of the life of a patient who is suffering unbearably, who has
no prospects, and who has expressly and earnestly requested for this termination is, as
a rule, morally acceptable, but I don't think that termination of life, generally, is
normally morally acceptable.' If Black shows the relevance of the ambiguity in such a
way he sustains his ambiguity criticism, and White loses the right to use euthanasia in
the ground level discussion, except if she makes it clear in what sense it must be
taken.
Black may respond to an alleged fallacy of equivocation by expressing that if
White disambiguates her argument, in whatever way, she will not be able to persuade
Black of the acceptability of the standpoint. If Black is correct, he will be able to point
out either an unacceptable premise, or an unacceptable inference license. If, in the
ensuing dialogue White fails to persuade Black, Black's ambiguity criticism becomes
sustained. If, however, White succeeds, her success provides some guarantee for the
incorrectness of Black's ambiguity criticism.
The discussant who loses the metadiscussion has to pay some sort of price in
the ground level discussion (Krabbe 2003a). The price White has to pay if Black is
able to sustain his ambiguity criticism is that she must disambiguate her argument,
and that she should abstain from using the controversial expression again, except if
she makes it clear what more precise reading she has in mind. The price Black has to
pay if he is not able to sustain the ambiguity criticism is that he should retract his
ambiguity criticism and that he should accept that White continues to use the disputed
expression in the ground level discussion, without being obliged to specify a
particular disambiguation.
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Constitutive rules like these allow the discussants to argue about the issue at
hand, to raise an ambiguity criticism, to argue critically about the correctness of the
ambiguity criticism, and to return to the ground level discussion. The following
(incomplete) profile of dialogue shows which sequences of moves should be allowed
according to such a model for critical discussion:
White

The bill termination of life on request should be passed.

Black

Why?

White

Euthanasia is, as a rule, morally acceptable.

Black

The expression euthanasia is in this context actively ambiguous between
termination of life on request and termination, by a doctor, of the life of a
patient who is suffering unbearably, who has no prospects, and who has
expressly and earnestly requested for this termination.

White

Are these readings linguistically
admissible in this context of
utterance?

Is this distinction relevant for our
discussion?

Black

[performs a linguistic test that
decides this issue]

Neglecting the
distinction has lead
or might lead to the
following pseudoagreement: [Black
points one out]

This use of
euthanasia makes
your argument an
instance of
equivocation: if
you disambiguate
your argument I
will win.

Figure 2.
The fallacy of ambiguity has been defined as the violation of the rule for the
univocal use of language by a participant of an argumentative discussion. An
immanent dialectical criterion for White's having committed the fallacy of ambiguity
is that Black can win a critical metadiscussion about the issue of whether or not White
has used an actively ambiguous expression. According to this account, stating that
White has committed the fallacy of ambiguity against Black amounts to expressing
the expectation (Krabbe 1999, 467) that Black is able to win a metadiscussion of the
kind examined in this section.5

The pragma-dialectical program
Recently, van Eemeren and Houtlosser have proposed a program for
developing criteria for the identification of violations of the various norms for critical
discussion (van Eemeren and Houtlosser 2003). The program is based on their
concept of strategic manoeuvring. A starting point is that there are several types of
strategic manoeuvring. A suitable typology can be derived from the distinction
between persuasive and critical aims in the four stages of the model for critical
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discussion. For every type of manoeuvre we can formulate correctness criteria, such
that if a discussant's manoeuvre does not fulfil the criteria, he has not able to reconcile
his persuasive with his critical aims due to giving priority to persuasive aims at the
expense of critical aims. For instance, if a party puts forward argumentation from
authority, and the argument fails to satisfy a criterion for correct manoeuvring with
argumentation from authority, the argument may exemplify argumentum ad
verecundiam.
How could such a program be applied to the fallacy of ambiguity?
Presumably, active ambiguity may play a role in several types of strategic
manoeuvring. Thus, for all these types there must be a correctness criterion to the
effect that using an active ambiguity makes the strategic manoeuvre incorrect. Given
my understanding of active ambiguity, the criterion should be something like: 'a
strategic manoeuvre is correct, only if it does not make use of an expression that is
contextually and covertly ambiguous such that the distinction between its meanings
matters to the course of the discussion.'
There are some differences between the pragma-dialectical and the immanent
dialectical approach. The first, more than the second, is concerned with strategic
considerations that are rhetorical rather than dialectical. The second, more than the
first, takes a participant's perspective on fallacies. However, we may expect the results
of both approaches to converge. We may expect White to win a metadiscussion about
the issue whether a certain expression in her argument is actively ambiguous if and
only if her argument satisfies the correctness criterion stated above. We may expect
Black to win the metadiscussion if and only if White's arguments fails to satisfy this
correctness criterion.

Dialectical flaws in a metadiscussion
The dialectical criterion for the fallacy of ambiguity will not always lead to a
clear result. In certain cases we may expect the metadiscussion to result in a draw.
Moreover, we may sometimes expect disagreements to arise about the issue of
whether a certain move in a metadiscussion is itself dialectically admissible. Such a
disagreement would diminish our confidence in the discussion as providing a reliable
indicator of the acceptability or unacceptability of the standpoint that White has
committed the fallacy of ambiguity. The rules outlined above pretend to rule out
fallacies and to present an explication of straightforwardly resolving a metadiscussion
about the fallaciousness of White's choice of words. But real metadiscussions may
contain fallacies. In order to reflect on a concept such as a fallacious fallacy criticism
we may construct models in which discussants can raise fallacy criticisms within
metadiscussions about alleged fallaciousness.
As we have seen, failing to specify the relevance of the alleged active
ambiguity amounts to a certain kind of nit-picking.
Andy: I am good to animals, because my cat never ran away.
Barry: Cat, that's actively ambiguous between Felis domesticus, male or female, and
tom-cat!
Andy: Nit-picker!!
Andy seems to start a metadiscussion about the appropriateness of a move in a
metadiscussion. Barry’s ambiguity criticism allegedly hinders conflict resolution in an
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undue manner by starting a metadiscussion about the expression cat. This expression
might, indeed, be contextually ambiguous, but the difference between the readings
seems clearly irrelevant for their discussion about whether Andy is good to animals.
Hence, from Andy’s perspective, the metadiscussion is lost time, and leads to a
needless postponement of resolution of the dispute.

Notes
1

Van Eemeren and Houtlosser's concept of a persuasive aim is broader than Krabbe
and Walton's concept of the aim of a participant. The latter refers only to dialectical
objectives, while the former also includes aims that are rhetorical, rather than
dialectical (Krabbe 2003b).

2

So, whatever disambiguation the proponent of such an argument would choose,
either the result contains at least one unacceptable basic reason, or it is based on an
unacceptable inference license.

3

There are also active ambiguities that go against the constitutive rules of critical
discussion (van Laar 2003).

4

The opponent of the main thesis may also misuse active ambiguities when putting
his position in words. In addition to enabling discussants to raise fallacy criticisms,
dialectical models should also provide both parties with devices to correct active
ambiguities introduced by themselves, even when they are not characterised as
inadmissible by the other party (for such a model, see van Laar 2003).
5

If an analyst states that a certain proponent has committed the fallacy of ambiguity,
this statement can be understood in at least two ways: either the analyst expects the
proponent to lose a metadiscussion with her interlocutor, or the analyst expects the
proponent to lose a metadiscussion with the analyst in the role of critic.

9

J. A. van Laar’s “The Charge of Ambiguity”

References
Eemeren, F.H. van, R. Grootendorst. 1992. Argumentation, Communication and
Fallacies. Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Eemeren, F.H. van, P. Houtlosser. 2003. "Fallacies as derailments of strategic
maneuvering: The argumentum ad verecundiam, a case in point." In the Proceedings
of the Fifth International Conference of the International Society for the Study of
Argumentation (2002). Forthcoming.
Johnson, R.H. 2000. Manifest rationality: a pragmatic theory of argument. Mahwah
N.J. (etc.): Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Krabbe, E.C.W. 1999. "The Dialectic of Quasi-Logical Arguments." In F.H. Van
Eemeren, R. Grootendorst, J.A. Blair and C.A. Willard (eds.), Proceedings of the
Fourth International Conference of the International Society for the Study of
Argumentation (June 16-19, 1998), 464-471. Amsterdam: Sicsat.
Krabbe, E.C.W. 2003a. "Metadialogues." In the Proceedings of the Fifth International
Conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation (2002).
Forthcoming.
Krabbe, E.C.W. 2003b. "Strategies in Dialectic and Rhetoric." In Argumentation and
its Applications, Proceedings from the Conferences of the Ontario Society for the
Study of Argumentation, May 17-19, 2001, University of Windsor, Windsor,
(Ontario). Forthcoming.
Laar, J.A. van. 2001. "Ambiguity in a Dialectical Perspective," Informal Logic 21:
245-266.
Laar, J.A. van. 2003. The Dialectic of Ambiguity: A Contribution to the Study of
Argumentation. Dissertation, University of Groningen.
Naess, A. 1953. Interpretation and preciseness: a contribution to the theory of
communication. Oslo: Dybwad.
Walton, D.N. 1996. Fallacies arising from ambiguity. Dordrecht (etc.): Kluwer
Academic Publishers.
Walton, D.N., E.C.W. Krabbe. 1995. Commitment in Dialogue: Basic Concepts of
Interpersoanal Reasoning. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.

10

